Friday 29 April 2016

The Hindu Caste System – India’s Safety Valve?

The Hindu Caste System – India’s Safety Valve?

Written by Dr. Seshadri Kumar, 29 April, 2016

Copyright © Dr. Seshadri Kumar.  All Rights Reserved.

For other articles by Dr. Seshadri Kumar, please visit http://www.leftbrainwave.com

Disclaimer: All the opinions expressed in this article are the opinions of Dr. Seshadri Kumar alone and should not be construed to mean the opinions of any other person or organization, unless explicitly stated otherwise in the article.

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Caste is one of the most infamous aspects of Hinduism. The caste system of Hinduism segregates people into hierarchies that are defined by birth and which are impossible for one to get out of. Innumerable injustices have been carried out over millennia on the basis of caste discrimination by people who belong to castes considered superior to others. Even today, cases of extreme injustice keep appearing regularly in the newspapers.

However, on careful examination, one has to wonder if these divisions have not resulted in a safer situation in India relative to what could have been. In what follows, I explain why I think caste discrimination may have had an unintended positive consequence for India.

Religious Intolerance Worldwide

Religious intolerance has led to the persecution of minorities in countries worldwide. This has been going on for millennia. Let us take a look at just some of these:


·       Wars between Christians and Muslims, Slavs, Jews, and Pagans in the Crusades for centuries
o   5000 Jews were killed in the People’s Crusade in 3 months in 1096
o   10000 Muslims were killed when Jerusalem was taken by the Crusaders in 1099
o   6000 Pagans were killed in the Battle of St. Matthew’s Day, which was fought to convert the pagans of Livonia (present-day Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia)
o   Many more examples of unprovoked aggression in the name of religion during the Crusades
o   About 2000 Jews expelled
o   Forced conversion of 100,000 Jews and forced expulsion of 100,000 Jews
o   Removal of 500,000 Muslims from Spain and eradication of Islam
o   Tens of thousands of Catholic Irish massacred by Cromwell’s forces at the battles of Drogheda, Wexford, Waterford, Limerick, and Galway
o   Expulsion of large numbers of Catholics from Ireland to work as indentured labourers in the West Indies
o   Hundreds of thousands of Catholic Irish killed by a forced famine caused by the destruction of their food stocks
o   The banning of the Catholic faith and the execution of any Catholic priests found
o   Approximately 50,000 Native Americans were forcibly evicted from their homes in the 1830s by an act of the American Congress authorizing military force to do so. Thousands of them died in forced marches in winter without food and adequate clothing in what has been called the Trail of Tears. This act arose from racial hatred of the Native Americans
o   130,000 Muslims living in Slavonia in Croatia ethnically cleansed and exiled to Bosnia and Herzegovina
o   Almost 300,000 Crimean Tatars expelled by the Russians from their homes
o   Expulsion of 1.5 million Bulgarian Muslims after the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78
·       The killing of ethnic Armenian Christians in the Ottoman Empire
o   The genocide of up to 1.5 million Armenian Christians of the Orthodox Faith by the Ottomans in Armenia
·       The Chinese policy towards Tibet, from the days of the Kuomintang to modern Communist China – a policy based on religious intolerance towards the Buddhist Tibetans
o   Up to 1.2 million Tibetans killed by Chinese governments
o   Six million Jews, comprising two-thirds of the Jewish population of Europe, and including 1.5 million children, murdered in cold blood
o   Over 250,000 Tamil citizens killed in a 25-year long civil war
o   The state has sanctioned the genocide of more than a million Muslims
o   Forced name changes for the entire ethnic Turkish population of Bulgaria (about 900,000 people) and their replacement by Christian names as part of a “rebirth” process
o   Banning the use of the Turkish language
o   Banning the use of Turkish ethnic dress
o   Closure of all mosques
o   Mass expulsions of those who did not comply to Turkey (about 360,000 Bulgarian Turks)
o   More than 100,000 citizens of Bhutan of Nepalese descent were expelled from Bhutan between 1992 and 1996
o   The ethnic cleansing of more than 2000 Bosnian Muslims in the Lasva Valley genocide from May 1992 to April 1993
o   The Prijedor Massacre of 1992, in which over 5000 Bosnians and Croats were massacred
o   The Visegrad Massacre of 1992, in which around 3000 Bosnian Muslims were killed by Serbs

o   Many more incidents…

·        This is just a partial list, and highlights how dangerous life can be for religious minorities in any country.

India has, for the most part, been spared of this kind of violence (I will discuss the exceptions in what follows), in spite of its status as a nation with the largest Hindu population in the world – a religion with a dominant majority (80%). 

Going by the kind of violence that religious minorities in so many countries have faced, one would not be wrong in thinking that India might have become a theocratic Hindu state a long time ago following an orgy of violence that eliminated, ethnically cleansed, or forcibly converted its minority religions. 

But this has not happened. Why?

Triggers for Religious Pogroms Worldwide

The cases of extreme religious discrimination mentioned above all had potent triggers. The enmity between the Jews and Christians goes back to the Christian Bible, where Jews are held responsible for the execution of Jesus. But many other conflicts have much more recent triggers. Consider the Bosnian Civil War as an example.

The trouble in the Balkans that led to the Bosnian civil war of 1992 can be traced back to Muslim invasions of the region and wars in the middle ages involving Christians and Muslims. Yugoslavia was a former colony of the Ottoman Empire, and so contained both Christian and Muslim populations that were well-mixed. One of the key historical events leading to the inflammation of tensions in Kosovo, for example, is the fact that Kosovo was the site of a major war between the Ottomans and the Serbs, which resulted in Serbia becoming part of the Ottoman Empire – the Battle of Kosovo in 1389. As a result, religious tensions were always quite high in this region. However, with the rise of Josip Broz Tito at the end of World War II, anyone trying to cause religious trouble was put down with an iron hand. But after his death in 1990, the floodgates opened, leading to the division of the country and genocide.

Compared to this, India has plenty of historical baggage that could be the basis of a lot of bad blood between Hindus and Muslims. From the 11th century onwards, large parts of India were conquered, looted, and ruled by foreign rulers of the Islamic faith. Hindus lived as second-hand citizens in the country in which they were a majority; they had to endure forced conversions; their temples were destroyed and mosques built over the ruins of their temples; and they had to pay a discriminatory, religion-based tax to their Muslim rulers. For 300 years, most of India was ruled by the Islamic Mughal Empire. Some of these are disputed by certain scholars, but these are generally accepted as having happened in the popular narrative, whatever their historicity. There is, thus, plenty of fuel to throw into a raging inferno of incendiary claims whereby a few million Muslims can be killed and the rest forced to leave India.

However, this has not happened. This is not to suggest that Hindu-Muslim violence has not happened in India or is not a routine occurrence. Violent incidents happen, but their scale is relatively small. One notable “large” incident was the partition of British India into an India and a Pakistan – but this was a very emotive issue that forced people to leave their land and possessions behind to migrate to another place almost as penniless beggars – a time and place of extreme personal hardship, where emotions naturally ran high. This is by far the most significant incident of religious violence in the Indian subcontinent, leading to the speculated deaths of two million people. But apart from this event which was for the most part forced by a violent partition of the land, most other religious riots cause deaths at most in the tens or hundreds, with very few touching a toll of thousands. For example, the most well-known incident of religious violence in recent years is the 2002 pogrom in Gujarat, in which about 2000 people were estimated to have died. Deaths resulting from religious violence in India are only about 0.01 per 100,000, as compared to a world average of 7.9.

So why is religious violence in India so low?

It is very tempting to suggest that this is because Hinduism is a very tolerant religion. There is some truth to this because of Hinduism's (quite exceptional) attitude that God exists in many forms and that there are many paths to God, all equally valid - quite unlike the "my way or the highway" attitude of Christianity or Islam, both of which believe that salvation is obtained only by belief in the specific God of their religion and by acceptance of their specific doctrines.

But this is not the only reason, as I explain below.

One important aspect of all the cases of religious discrimination worldwide, mentioned above, is that the oppressing group saw itself as largely homogeneous. For instance, Irish Protestants see themselves as largely a monolithic group when compared with the Irish Catholics. Shias and Sunnis see themselves as largely monolithic and oppress the other when one is in a majority in a state. Neither of them recognize the Ahmadiyyas, another sect in Islam, as Muslims at all. During the Crusades, all Christians banded together as working for a common cause against the Arabs who controlled Jerusalem. The Spanish who expelled the Jews and Muslims from Spain towards the end of the 15th century saw themselves as a monolithic Catholic state and saw the Jews and the Muslims as the “other.” The Buddhists who persecuted the Hindus in Sri Lanka, whatever minor divisions they might have had within themselves, saw themselves as one against the “other” of the Hindus; the same can be said of the Buddhists in Myanmar who discriminated against the Rohingya Muslims. Similarly, in all the historic injustices towards the Jews over the centuries, including those by the Nazis, they were seen as the “other” by a largely united Christian majority.

The Lack of Homogeneity Among Hindus

But Hindus, by and large, do not see themselves as a monolithic block. And the reason for this is the infamous caste system. Not only do the four major categories of castes – known as the “varnas” – the Brahmins (priests), Kshatriyas (warriors), Vaishyas (merchants), and Shudras (labourers), plus the fifth category of outcastes or untouchables – known variously as panchamas, oppressed castes, depressed castes, ati-Shudras (archaic terms), or Dalits (modern term) – not traditionally mix with each other socially, but even within a given varna, different jatis (castes) generally don’t mix socially in traditional environments.

Hindu society, as Ambedkar famously said, is a collection of castes. The Hindu cares only for his or her fellow-caste person; other Hindus do not mean anything to him/her. While things have changed a lot at a microscopic level since Ambedkar wrote about Hindu society, his observations are still true at the larger level. The one aspect of social mixture in which this is most obvious is marriage. Hindus still marry, by and large, within their caste. Urbanization and the presence of more women in the working force has changed this to some extent, but the majority of marriages, even today in Hindu society, are “arranged” by the parents based on caste compatibility.

So the “Hindu” sees himself first as a caste entity and then in the broader sense as a Hindu. As Ambedkar says in The Annihilation of Caste, “A Hindu’s public is his caste. His responsibility is only to his caste. His loyalty is restricted only to his caste. Virtue has become caste-ridden, and morality has become caste-bound. There is no sympathy for the deserving. There is no appreciation of the meritorious. There is no charity to the needy. Suffering as such calls for no response. There is charity, but it begins with the caste and ends with the caste. There is sympathy, but not for men of other castes.” The Hindu’s hatred for a non-Hindu, specifically a Muslim, is only marginally greater than his hatred for Hindus from other castes. 

Again, I am talking about real “social mixture.” Specifically, I want to focus on the arranged marriage. I myself was married through an arranged marriage, and since I belonged to the Brahmin Varna and the Iyer caste of Tamil Brahmins, my bride had to belong to the Tamil Iyer caste. Only in extreme situations (such as, say, I fell in love with a girl) would they have considered my marrying a Tamil Iyengar (another Brahmin caste) girl; and my marrying a non-Brahmin girl would be almost as distasteful to them as my marrying a Muslim.

This mutual hatred and distrust of the different Hindu castes has prevented them from engaging in large-scale, organized displays of bigotry and hatred against non-Hindus. Since Hinduism itself is quite loosely defined and contains deep divisions within, uniting together to oppress other minorities is a much lower probability event than, say, the Shias in Iran uniting to oppress non-Shias and non-Muslims, or the Sunni majority in Pakistan uniting to oppress non-Sunnis and non-Muslims. For, the Sunni, the Shia, or the Christian has a very clear idea of who he is – the “Hindu” has only a very vague idea of what makes him a Hindu.

How Caste-Based Division of Hindu Society Prevents Genocide

For every Hindu-Muslim riot in India, one could list half a dozen inter-caste violence incidents, whether between Kammas and Kapus, between Marathas and Mahars, between Vanniyars and Parayars, and so on. It should be pointed out that most inter-caste violence incidents in India have been of upper castes or “caste Hindus” (those belonging to the four castes) committing violence against the Dalits. These constitute an effective “safety valve” against Hindu-Muslim violence – one can only have so much anger, after all, and a lot of it goes away after you kill a few people. In effect, the Dalits form a sacrificial group that bears the brunt of the prejudice of the Hindus.

While the killing of Dalits is despicable and cannot be condoned, it cannot be denied that it probably prevents larger-scale Hindu violence against non-Hindu minorities, and that it is also much smaller in scale than the international pogroms that have been discussed earlier. One reason for this is that anti-Dalit violence is usually local and small in scale; it is usually related to local and specific hatreds between communities that may go back a long way. Anti-Muslim violence, on the other hand, can be easily generalized to a national scale and does not need specific triggers – one can easily inflame passions by talking about how India was ravaged by Muslim invasions, for instance, without going into specific details.

In addition, caste-based discrimination goes far beyond only violence. Inter-caste hatred is prevalent in all aspects of Indian society. Wherever there is a discretionary role, there is a high chance that caste will be the basis of discretion. Many employers (when they legally can) will prefer a person of their own caste rather than a person of a different caste. Many housing societies will not prefer to have members who belong to a caste they look down upon. These divisions ensure that Hindus are sufficiently divided among themselves to resist forming a united group with a single overriding identity.

So, despite Indian liberals’ deep misgivings about the caste system and the discrimination and cruelty it engenders, they should probably be grateful that Hinduism contains within itself the seeds of its disunity and, as a result, prevents Hindus from organizing themselves to the level of being able to orchestrate the scale of pogroms that other religions have done so spectacularly. That the most talked-about pogrom in recent times, the 2002 Gujarat Pogrom, only led to an estimated 2000 killed in a city (Ahmedabad) of more than 5.5 million people and containing more than 300,000 Muslims, and not tens of thousands dead, is evidence of the fact that Hindus do not act in a united way on issues of religion. Horrified as we should be that 2000 people might have been killed, we should be grateful for the caste-mediated fracturing of the Hindu population that prevented this death toll from being at least ten times greater.

It should be pointed out that, in recent years, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and its political arm, the ruling party in India, the Bharatiya Janata Party, have tried very hard to unite Hindus over a common front motivated by hatred of Muslims and Dalits. It is a very worrying sign that a growing number of Indians are subscribing to this negative philosophy.

However, as long as Hindus continue to marry by looking at matrimonial columns that first and foremost advertise the caste and sub-caste of the individual, the bark of the Hindutva movement is worse than its bite.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank my wife, Sandhya Srinivasan, for her constructive comments on this manuscript and her helpful suggestions. I would also like to thank Ganesh Prasad for helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this article.

Tuesday 9 February 2016

A Data-Driven Baseline for Understanding Indian Development

A Data-Driven Baseline for Understanding Indian Development

Written by Dr. Seshadri Kumar, 11 February, 2016

Copyright © Dr. Seshadri Kumar.  All Rights Reserved.

For other articles by Dr. Seshadri Kumar, please visit http://www.leftbrainwave.com

Disclaimer: All the opinions expressed in this article are the opinions of Dr. Seshadri Kumar alone and should not be construed to mean the opinions of any other person or organization, unless explicitly stated otherwise in the article.

Disclaimer 2: Every attempt has been made to ensure the accuracy of the data presented herein. However, it is always possible that some errors may have crept into the work, despite the most diligent efforts of the author. The author accepts the responsibility for any errors found and humbly requests those who may find these errors to inform him via comments and the same shall be rectified if found to be in error.


Update, 18 February 2016: 21 new indicators were added to increase the number of key indicators studied from 38 to 59. The new indicators added were the corruption score and the ease of doing business indices. More indicators will be added later, so this is a living document. I invite people to point me to more data sources to make this an even more valuable citizen resource.

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Abstract

The word “development” has been bandied around quite freely in Indian economic and political discourse recently, without much understanding of what it really entails. This study attempts to provide a quantitative baseline for development in India by identifying key development indicators and then studying how these indicators are changing in India, based on data from three past governments at the centre in India: the NDA government of 1999-2004 and the UPA governments of 2004-2009 and 2009-2014.

Development is a complex concept comprising a number of macroeconomic, financial, infrastructural, health, social, environmental, and innovation dimensions. This study explores 59 key indicators comprising all these dimensions. These are: GDP, GNI per capita (PPP), exports, FDI, GCF, total reserves, percentage of non-performing loans, corruption score, bank capital-to-assets ratio (CAR), inflation, unemployment rate, electricity consumption, energy consumption, highways, railways, container traffic, internet penetration, mobile telephony, transport investment with private participation, telecom investment with private participation, energy investment with private participation, ratio of industry and services to agriculture, population growth rate, sanitation, clean water, life expectancy, under-5 mortality, measles immunization, DPT immunization, gender parity, secondary school enrolment, adolescent fertility, total fertility, forest cover, protected area percentage, trademark applications, patent applications, new businesses registered, hi-technology exports, and 20 indices on the ease of doing business: Distance to Frontier (DTF) metrics on starting a business, paying taxes, electricity availability, registering property, getting credit, protecting minority investors, trading across borders, and resolving insolvency; and individual metrics on time needed to start a business, cost of starting a business, paid-in minimum capital for a business, cost of construction permits, cost of obtaining electricity, time needed to register property, cost of registering property, strength of legal rights, credit bureau coverage, number of tax payments per year, time spent on paying taxes, and total tax rate.

The achievements and shortcomings of the two administrations with respect to these development indicators should give pause to those who are interested in the future of Indian development and should help them define more sharply what is meant by development in a quantitative way and how much can realistically be achieved. 

Introduction

For the last 3 years, probably the most overused word in Indian political and economic discussions has been the word “development” – or its Hindi equivalent, “vikas.”

This topic took centre stage starting in 2013, when the election campaign for the 2014 general elections began. The present government, led by Mr. Narendra Modi, came to power in a landslide victory in May 2014 mainly on the promise of much better development than the previous ruling dispensation. Even after that victory, the topic of development has been the focus of much debate.

But better development relative to what?

The term development has been very loosely defined. Economic development encompasses many dimensions – macroeconomic, financial, infrastructural, environmental, social, health, financial, and scientific. Political parties, in their posturing, have often chosen to constrain the debate in narrow ways so as to benefit themselves. For example, the BJP has often talked about its government’s achievements in the road sector, while the UPA has focused on malnutrition and declines in the Human Development Index (HDI).

How can one talk of more development unless one understands what the current state of the nation’s development is? What are the different facets of development and what is the country’s current status on each of these aspects? And, finally, what kind of growth has historically taken place in the country in the sphere of development? These questions have to be answered if we need to critically evaluate the performance of an elected government with regard to economic and social development.

Developing a baseline on the key components of development and understanding the historical data on development is the focus of this article. I have focused on what has been achieved in the three governments preceding the current one – the UPA governments of 2004-2009 and 2009-2014 and the NDA government of 1999-2004. Once we have a clear idea of what the current and past development indicators of India are, we will be in a position to engage in a more meaningful and intelligent debate on what "greater" development to expect from the present government.

To do this, I have used the most reliable data I could find – that from the World Bank. The World Bank has data on an astonishing number of parameters from every country, which it gleans from various sources, chiefly the countries’ own statistics offices, such as the Ministry of Statistics, Planning, and Implementation (MOSPI) in India. Since the website of the World Bank is much easier to navigate than the website of MOSPI, I have chosen to take data from the World Bank website.

To this, I have also added the corruption scores from Transparency International, and the Ease of Doing Business Indices available from the World Bank Group Ease of Doing Business website.

I am aware that several important indicators are still missing from this work. They will be added at a later stage. These include important indicators such as balance of trade and current account deficit.

Two caveats need to be mentioned here, and the reader should use caution here. One, many subjects are state subjects, and so improvements in those indicators may be driven more by the actions of a state government rather than the central government. But both governments may have a role. Even if the execution is in the hands of the state government, funding may flow from the centre. It is not easy for me to separate the contributions of the state and centre in these indicators. The reader is advised to excercise due discretion. Two, all governments benefit from the good or bad actions of past governments. The effects of certain policies of an elected government may manifest themselves only when it leaves office. So it may seem unfair to some that the credit for an improvement goes to the government presently in power rather than to the previous government. However, I believe this is a zero-sum game. Succinctly put, you win some, you lose some. For instance, the present government might suffer from the lower growth rates of the last two years of the UPA-2 government, but it is already benefiting from the enormous investments made by the previous government in the transparency infrastructure, specifically the Aadhar program and the Jan Dhan Yojana, both of which were started during UPA-2. Similarly, all governments after the PV Narasimha Rao government have benefited from their liberalization policies. So this is part of political life. You get credit for achievements that happen during your rule.

Metrics/Indicators

I have categorized the various development indicators into the following buckets:

·       Economic and Financial
o   Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Growth Rate
o   Gross National Income (GNI) (Based on Purchasing Power Parity - PPP) Per Capita
o   Exports
o   Inflation
o   Unemployment Rate

o   Corruption Score

·       Infrastructural
o   Electricity Consumption
o   Energy Consumption
o   Highways
o   Railways
o   Container Traffic
o   Internet Penetration
o   Mobile Telephony
o   Transport Investment with Private Participation
o   Telecom Investment with Private Participation
o   Energy Investment with Private Participation
o   Ratio of Industry and Services, Combined, to Agriculture
·       Health
o   Population Growth Rate
o   Sanitation
o   Clean Water
o   Life Expectancy
o   Under-5 Mortality
o   Immunization – Measles
o   Immunization – DPT
·       Social
o   Gender Parity
o   Secondary School Enrolment
o   Adolescent  Fertility
o   Total Fertility
·       Environmental
o   Forest Cover
o   Protected Areas
·       Innovation and Science
o   Trademark Applications
o   Patent Applications
o   New Businesses Registered
o   High-technology Exports
·       Ease of Doing Business Metrics
o   Starting a Business – DTF
o   Paying Taxes – DTF
o   Electricity Availability – DTF
o   Registering Property – DTF
o   Getting Credit – DTF
o   Protecting Minority Investors – DTF
o   Trading Across Borders – DTF
o   Resolving Insolvency – DTF
o   Time Needed to Start a Business
o   Cost of Starting a Business
o   Minimum Paid-In Capital for a Business
o   Cost of Construction Permits
o   Cost of Obtaining Electricity
o   Time Needed to Register Property
o   Cost of Registering Property
o   Strength of Legal Rights
o   Credit Bureau Coverage
o   Number of Tax Payments Per Year
o   Time Spent on Paying Taxes

o   Total Tax Rate

·       The World Bank site has many more metrics, but data on several of them is incomplete and too scarce to make a comparison. Also, data on highway construction was not available. I had to use data that I had previously collected (see here) to get the data – and it is not as fine-grained as the rest of the data, so the reader may see a difference in the way it is presented.

Methodology

The results shown in the next section are based on data for all the above metrics from the last three governments: NDA (1999-2004) and UPA (2004-2009 and 2009-2014). Understanding this data should serve to help understand what may be possible in the future. Averages shown are multi-year averages over the period of rule of the NDA (5-year) or UPA (both 5-year and 10-year), to the extent that data is available (some data was not available beyond 2012, for example).

Some data are presented only as averages because there is no logical reason to expect them to increase each year. In other categories, especially health and social indices, it makes logical sense to compare overall percentage improvement over the duration of the rule of the party, because those indices are expected to improve with time. Similarly, growth rates may vary from year to year depending on various factors, including international market conditions, oil prices, and the like, so it makes most sense to look at long-term averages. FDI is also something that can, technically speaking, vary from year to year; however, it is an accepted national objective to increase the level of FDI in the Indian economy, and so it makes sense to track its percentage growth rate. 

Also, in some cases, increases are shown rather than or in addition to percentage increases because the starting value may have little to do with the final value. One example of a case where I have preferred to use increases rather than percentages is in mobile telephony: here the starting number for the NDA government was so low that percentage improvements would lead to drastically high and meaningless percentage increases – mobile telephony was only starting then.

In any case, the raw numbers are there in case someone wishes to interpret them differently. I have chosen the method that seemed to me most appropriate for any given data set.

Some of the data will favour the party which ruled most recently. For example mobile phone and internet penetration will favour the UPA because the technology has greatly developed in the last 15 years.

One other thing to keep in mind while interpreting the data is that the UPA had 10 years of rule whereas the NDA had only 5 years. So in some categories where a long-term improvement trend is expected, it would be reasonable to expect that the UPA’s overall improvement rate should be roughly double that of the NDA. For this reason, the individual statistics for UPA-1 and UPA-2 are also provided. 

Another fact worth noting is that improving health and social metrics from a higher base is more difficult than improving them from a lower base. So, for example, the UPA and NDA rates of improvement of access to clean water are comparable; however, the UPA’s achievement is greater owing to starting at a higher base.

It is notable that on many of the social metrics, despite starting at a higher base, the UPA’s performance has been impressive. For example, on Under-5 mortality, the UPA’s improvement is 36% compared to the NDA’s 15%. Similarly, the UPA seems to have shown remarkable effort in last-mile immunization efforts, as its 28% improvement in DPT immunization relative to the NDA’s 9% shows.

Some people have wondered if it might be better to show the data as a continuous timeline rather than in 5-year periods. My rationale for showing the data graphically in this format is twofold: One, it clearly highlights the improvement (or decline) in each regime, and two, when you cover a 15-year period, financial data cannot be presented in raw format because of inflation - I would need to convert all my figures into PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) numbers, which was more trouble than I was willing to go through right now.

Summarized Results

Economic and Financial Metrics

·       GDP:
·       GNI Per-Capita Based on PPP (USD):
       The GNI is different from GDP in that it accounts for all income, including income generated abroad. The figures reflect purchasing-power parity (PPP) - essentially, based not on just the exchange rate but on what money can actually buy.

·       Total Exports (Billion USD):
·       FDI (Billion USD):
·       Average Gross Capital Formation (GCF):
       The GCF measures how much of a country's income is invested in generating new fixed assets instead of just being saved. This is important for a developing country like India.

·       Total Reserves (Billion USD):
     Non-Performing Loans (% of Total Loans):
       A Non-Performing Loan is a loan that is given by a bank and not repaid for a variety of reasons, such as the business that borrowed the money failing. Often there is an element of corruption involved, as the bank manager may know in advance that this is a bogus business. A high percentage of non-performing loans means the bank is susceptible to collapse and is bad for a country's economy.

      Bank Capital-to-Assets Ratio (CAR):
       The CAR is the ratio of a bank's capital to its risk. A high value means that the bank can absorb a certain amount of loss without collapsing. The higher the CAR value, the more stable the economy and the safer consumers are in depositing their money in the bank. This, in turn, enables the bank to lend money to businesses to boost growth. Note that some approximations had to be made in getting the above figures, since data were not available for 1999, 2004, 2005, and 2006.

     Inflation Rate:
       Inflation clearly rose significantly in UPA-1 after being low for all of the NDA years, and then came down in UPA-2.

     Unemployment Rate:
The unemployment rate came down during the UPA years because of the tremendous growth of the economy.

Corruption Score:

Transparency International annually compiles a corruption score based on several aspects, measured by several surveys, for all countries. The score is between 0 and 100, with 100 representing no corruption and 0 representing complete corruption.


Infrastructural Metrics:

·       Per-Capita Electricity Consumption (kWh):
     Per-Capita Energy Consumption (kg of Oil Equivalent):
       High per-capita electricity usage and energy usage are desirable in a developing country like India because they indicate that the country is getting more industrialized and modernized. Electricity demand is important because of both rural electrification and industrial electricity use, and energy consumption in terms of fuel is also important as an indicator of industrialization. For the energy consumption table, data were not available in the World Bank database for 2013 and 2014, so the actual figures for UPA-2 might be better.

·       Total Length of Highways, Km (data from this study):
       Highways are a crucial part of infrastructure development, as are railways. Highways are extremely important because of their ability to transport containers, and railways are needed for really large-scale freight transport.

·       Total Length of Railway Lines (km):
·       Total Container Port Traffic (Measured in Million 20-Feet Units)
       Container port traffic is affected both by the quality and capacity of sea-ports as well as the downstream infrastrucure of highways.

·       Internet Penetration (Number of Connections Per 100 People):

·       Mobile Telephony (Number of Subscriptions Per 100 People):
      The telecom revolution happened during the UPA years - both UPA-1 and UPA-2. This was an important part of development, as it allowed the nation to leapfrog over the limitation of conventional phone lines. The internet boom has happened mainly during UPA-2.

·       Transport Investment With Private Participation (in Billion USD):

·       Telecom Investment with Private Participation (in Billion USD):

·       Energy Investment with Private Partnership (in Billion USD):

       These three are measures of privatization in key infrastructure areas. The UPA-1 government seems to have done outstanding work, but privatization in infrastructure suffered heavily during UPA-2. Privatization is necessary because it brings funds to infrastructure projects through debt and equity and allows faster growth in infrastructure. This allows the government to develop more infrastructure than it could with tax revenues and cesses alone.

     Industry and Services, Combined, as % of GDP:

       This is an important metric for a developing country, especially a traditionally agrarian economy like India. There are three main sectors of any economy: agriculture, industry, and services. The conventional wisdom is that the share of agriculture in the nation's economy needs to go down and the share of the industry and services sector should rise for the country to become a developed country. For instance, the USA's share of agriculture in GDP is around 1.4% of GDP; the corresponding figure in the UK is 0.7%; in Russia it is 4.2%; in Italy it is 2.2%; and in France it is 1.7%. The remaining share is that of industry and services. India's combined share of industry and services should aim to be close to 90-95%; we are still far away from that, but it is improving. Clearly, the data show that industrialization was most rapid during the NDA years. While the UPA had a higher base to start with, the gap to close was (and is) still quite large, so they could have done more in this regard.

Health Metrics:

·       Population Growth Rate (%):
       The population growth rate in India has been steadily decreasing for a few decades now, and the numbers are near constant across all governments. This is because population control measures such as family planning education that were started decades ago have been continued steadily by successive governments.

·       Sanitation (% of Population With Access to Better Sanitation):
       As can be seen, improvements in sanitation have been happening at a steady rate over the years, but the absolute numbers are abysmal. Even at the end of UPA-2, only 40% had access to clean sanitation. It remains to be seen how much the present government's "Swacch Bharat" initiative can remedy this situation.

·       Clean Water (% of Population With Access to a Clean Water Source):
      Even though the absolute increases seem about the same for all the three governments, the achievement is greater for the latest government, because achieving the same absolute increase at a higher base is more difficult (harder to access deeper rural areas, etc.) This is especially true for the clean water figures as the numbers are approaching 100%.

·       Life Expectancy (Years at Birth):

·       Under-5 Mortality (Per 1000 Children):

·       Measles Immunization (% of Children Aged 12-23 Months):

·       DPT Immunization (% of Children Aged 12-23 Months):

      Most of the health-related metrics are constant across governments, because they are the result of long-term public health policies, such as vaccination, that have continued unabated across administrations.

Social Metrics:

·       Gender Parity Index (Ratio of Girls to Boys in Primary and Secondary School):
      Although the NDA government's performance seems much better on the basis of percentage increases, it should be noted that the ratio was already 0.9 by the start of the UPA government and they did not have much room to improve - the ideal of near 1 was reached during the first UPA administration itself. Also note that data were not available for 2004, 2013, and 2014.

·       Secondary School Enrolment (% of Children Enrolled):
      Again, the data were not available for 2013 and 2014, so data from 2012 was used to calculate the % increase and the end value. Hence the figures for UPA-2 and the overall UPA improvements might be understated.

·       Adolescent Fertility Rate (Births Per 1000 Women Aged 15-19):

·       Total Fertility Rate (Births Per Woman):

       The same continuous improvement story continues in these health/social metrics. For total fertility, too, as before, data was not available for 2014, so the numbers for UPA-2 might be below actual values.

Environmental Metrics:

·       Forest Cover (Total Area, sq. km.):

      Data were not available for 2013 and 2014.

·       Protected Areas (% of Total Area):

        It is difficult to comment on these environmental metrics. Increasing forest cover is not easy in a developing nation with constant demand on land for housing. Creating protected areas is an important part of environmental conservation, and creating new sanctuaries is getting progressively more difficult.

Innovation and Technology Metrics:

·       Number of Trademark Applications, Annual:

·       Number of Patent Applications, Annual:

      In both these metrics of innovation, the UPA-1 government has an outstanding record. Data for both these categories were not available for 2014, so 2013 data was used as the final point.

·       Number of New Businesses Registered:

       There was no data on this metric for the NDA years. But the pace really seems to have increased in UPA-2.

·       Average Hi-Tech Exports (% of Total Manufactured Exports):
       Clearly, the percentage of high-tech exports has been increasing with time, with the UPA-2 government having the best figures. One key reason is the continuing influx of software companies into India, which now has a momentum of its own.

       Ease of Doing Business Metrics

        The Ease of Doing Business website ranks countries in their ease of doing business using a number of metrics, many of which will be discussed here. These metrics are only available for the UPA-1 and UPA-2 years; data for the NDA years are not available. Ease of doing business is measured by various aspects, such as time needed to obtain permissions, cost of obtaining permissions, number of taxes filed, time spent on filing taxes, and so on. Broadly, they are grouped into the following heads: Starting a Business, Construction Permits, Obtaining Electricity, Paying Taxes, Registering Property, Getting Credit, Protecting Minority Investors, Trading Across Borders, and Resolving Insolvency.

        For each metric, individual sub-metrics are shown, and an overall Distance-To-Frontier (DTF) is also calculated in a weighted manner. The DTF concept is a weighted metric that measures how close a particular economy is to the best in all economies. It is rated on a 0-100 scale, with 100 representing the best performance of that metric in any economy, and 0 the worst (furthest from the frontier). Below, DTF metrics for several ease of business indicators are shown. It should be noted that these figures are specific to the city of Mumbai. The World Bank Group started with Mumbai and later added Delhi to their list of cities, but the most comprehensive data is only available for Mumbai, the financial capital of India.

        It should be kept in mind that many of these metrics are affected by both central and state rules and requirements. Permits needed to start a business might need a lot of paperwork at the state and city level as well as central permits. Paying taxes might be more of a central limitation, while trading across borders is clearly a central issue. So these must be kept in mind while analyzing these figures. However ease of doing business has been very much in the news lately as it pertains to India, so these figures are important to understand expectations.

      DTF: Starting a Business (0-100)
      Impressive gains appear to have been made under both UPA regimes.

      DTF: Paying Taxes (0-100)
     Clearly, ease of paying taxes improved greatly under UPA-2.

     DTF: Electricity Availability (0-100)

     DTF: Registering Property (0-100)
     The UPA-2 administration seems to have been unable to maintain the pace of ease of registering property. There is a strong state government component here as well.

      DTF: Getting Credit (0-100)

      DTF: Protecting Minority Investors (0-100)

      DTF: Trading Across Borders (0-100)

      DTF: Resolving Insolvency (0-100)

      Time Needed to Start a Business (Days)
      The improvement during the UPA-1 administration period in this area seems to have been very impressive. Again, there are many state permits needed for this, so this is a combined center/state achievement.

      Cost of Starting a Business (% of Income Per Capita)

      Minimum Paid-In Capital For a Business (% of Income Per Capita)
      The gains during both UPA administrations is impressive.

      Cost of Construction Permits (% of Warehouse Value)
      Again, significant improvements during both UPA administrations.

      Cost of Obtaining Electricity (% of Income Per Capita)
      Significant improvement during UPA-2. No data available for UPA-1 years.

      Time Needed to Register Property (Days)

      Cost of Registering Property (% of Property Value)

      Strength of Legal Rights Index (0 is Worst, 10 is Best)
       Significant improvement during UPA-1, no change during UPA-2.

       Credit Bureau Coverage (% of Population)
      Note that since the starting value for UPA-1 was zero, the next year was taken for the percentage increase. But it is probably more pertinent to look at the absolute increases in the percentage of the population covered under credit scores. The improvement is very good.

       Number of Tax Payments Per Year
      The real improvement seems to have happened during UPA-2.

       Time Spent on Paying Taxes (Days)
      The decreases are modest.

       Total Tax Rate (% of Profit)
      This took a step backward during UPA-1, but significant progress was made in UPA-2. High tax rates suppress innovation and stop new businesses from starting and growing.

       In summary, it can be seen that for most indices, significant increases in ease of doing business, with some exceptions, were seen overall across the two UPA administrations. In some cases, the improvment was in UPA-1 and a decline was seen in UPA-2; in some others it was vice versa. There were some indices which saw improvements in both administrations.

Summary

Development as a concept has been given a quantitative basis by characterizing India’s development using 59 key indices. The performance of the past three governments has been analysed using these indices. The 2004-2009 UPA government seems to have done better in most of the indices than the other two governments; but there are areas in which the other two governments have also done better. Together, the high watermarks of these three administrations give us an idea of how much development has been possible in India in the past 15 years of governments at the centre completing their terms.

These results are important in setting expectations of the current government. It is well-known that this government was elected on the promise of greater development. Until now, what exactly greater development meant has remained quite vague. It is hoped that this study will give much-needed clarity to the concept of development in the Indian context and that citizens of India will now understand what benchmarks the present government needs to exceed in order to fulfil its promises and take India on a higher-growth trajectory.


Acknowledgments

I would like to thank my wife, Sandhya, for her valuable inputs and thoughtful and intense discussions which have greatly helped improve the quality of this article. I would also like to thank her for her patience as I worked single-mindedly on this article while she shouldered all family responsibilities single-handedly without complaining. Additionally, I would also like to thank my friend Nilesh Rathi for reading an early draft of this article and for offering valuable suggestions that have greatly improved the article.

Appendix: Graphical Year-By-Year Results

In the previous sections, the summarized results were presented and discussed. To get a more fine-grained idea of the trends in the development indices, these are graphed on a year-by-year basis. The data for all three administrations (NDA, UPA 1, and UPA 2) are shown as a function of the year of their administration. So, for example, Year 1 would correspond to 2000 for the NDA (their first completed year), 2005 for UPA 1, and 2010 for UPA 2.